Are scientists conflating zoonotic origin of pathogens with zoonosis to the detriment of understanding, disease prevention and management?

To help setting boundaries to infectious disease aspects of One Health science, there is a need to define clearly meanings for terms commonly used to describe aspects of the science. The One Health High-Level Expert Panel, convened by the International Health Agencies, has now defined One Health https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1010537 providing a basis for examining ontology of key terms frequently used in the subject area, in the past and in the future. For example, when describing pathogens of concern to humans, originating from animals, narratives in use are extremely loose and unspecific. This can lead to confusion on the role of animals in human infections (from genetic origins through to contemporary infection sources), and this can lead to inappropriate response or interventions, as well as mislead research priorities. From an ethical and welfare standpoint, misunderstanding of the role or significance of animal origins can also cause unnecessary persecution or destruction of animals, justified by perceived benefits of these actions to human health security. In this context, there has been a trend to emphasise the role of wildlife species as a source of human pathogens based seemingly on myth, speculation or assumption. The key terms for consideration for the question are as follows: emerging infection disease (of humans), zoonotic origin pathogens, zoonosis and zooanthroponosis. These terms have been more commonly in use since the last decades of the 20th Century, coincident with an apparent rise in novel human infectious viral diseases, such as HIV AIDs, Ebola Virus, human and zoonotic influenzas (H1N1, H5N1) and the coronaviruses. Language is fundamental in providing a logical framework for understanding and knowledge. For the new Science of One Health, this is the first step to ensuring clear research directions. We invite authors to explore the historic use of these terms and their ontologies and examine if they provide sufficient specificity to enable clear understanding and interpretation of disease origins and/or are adequate to communicate and scientifically describe the epidemiological role of animals in human disease occurrence. Examining how the evolution of language in science and communication might influence prioritisation for research on as well as prevention and response to infectious diseases will be a core element in answering this question.

Advancing One human-animal-environment Health for global health security: what does the evidence say?

In this Series paper, we review the contributions of One Health approaches (ie, at the human-animal-environment interface) to improve global health security across a range of health hazards and we summarise contemporary evidence of incremental benefits of a One Health approach. We assessed how One Health approaches were reported to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN, the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), and WHO, within the monitoring and assessment frameworks, including WHO International Health Regulations (2005) and WOAH Performance of Veterinary Services. We reviewed One Health theoretical foundations, methods, and case studies. Examples from joint health services and infrastructure, surveillance-response systems, surveillance of antimicrobial resistance, food safety and security, environmental hazards, water and sanitation, and zoonoses control clearly show incremental benefits of One Health approaches. One Health approaches appear to be most effective and sustainable in the prevention, preparedness, and early detection and investigation of evolving risks and hazards; the evidence base for their application is strongest in the control of endemic and neglected tropical diseases. For benefits to be maximised and extended, improved One Health operationalisation is needed by strengthening multisectoral coordination mechanisms at national, regional, and global levels.

The disproportionate case-fatality ratio of COVID-19 between countries with the highest vaccination rates and the rest of the world.

Objectives: The global reported cumulative case-fatality ratios (rCFRs) and excess mortality rates of the 20 countries with the highest coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccination rates, the rest of the world and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) were compared before and after the commencement of vaccination programmes. Methods: A time series model was used to understand the trend of rCFR over time, and a generalized linear mixed model was used to understand the effect of vaccination on rCFR. Results: By 31 December 2022, an average of 260.3 doses of COVID-19 vaccine per 100 population had been administered in the top 20 vaccinated countries, compared with 152.1 doses in the rest of the world and 51.2 doses in SSA. The mean rCFR of COVID-19 had decreased by 69.0% in the top 20 vaccinated countries, 26.5% in the rest of the world and 7.6% in SSA. Excess mortality had decreased by 48.7% in the top 20 vaccinated countries, compared with 62.5% in the rest of the world and 60.7% in SSA. In a generalized linear mixed model, the reported number of vaccine doses administered (/100 population) (odds ratio 0.64) was associated with a steeper reduction in COVID-19 rCFR. Conclusions: Vaccine equity and faster roll-out across the world is critically important in reducing COVID-19 transmission and CFR.

Global and regional governance of One Health and implications for global health security.

The apparent failure of global health security to prevent or prepare for the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need for closer cooperation between human, animal (domestic and wildlife), and environmental health sectors. However, the many institutions, processes, regulatory frameworks, and legal instruments with direct and indirect roles in the global governance of One Health have led to a fragmented, global, multilateral health security architecture. We explore four challenges: first, the sectoral, professional, and institutional silos and tensions existing between human, animal, and environmental health; second, the challenge that the international legal system, state sovereignty, and existing legal instruments pose for the governance of One Health; third, the power dynamics and asymmetry in power between countries represented in multilateral institutions and their impact on priority setting; and finally, the current financing mechanisms that predominantly focus on response to crises, and the chronic underinvestment for epidemic and emergency prevention, mitigation, and preparedness activities. We illustrate the global and regional dimensions to these four challenges and how they relate to national needs and priorities through three case studies on compulsory licensing, the governance of water resources in the Lake Chad Basin, and the desert locust infestation in east Africa. Finally, we propose 12 recommendations for the global community to address these challenges. Despite its broad and holistic agenda, One Health continues to be dominated by human and domestic animal health experts. Substantial efforts should be made to address the social-ecological drivers of health emergencies including outbreaks of emerging, re-emerging, and endemic infectious diseases. These drivers include climate change, biodiversity loss, and land-use change, and therefore require effective and enforceable legislation, investment, capacity building, and integration of other sectors and professionals beyond health.

A global analysis of One Health Networks and the proliferation of One Health collaborations.

There has been a renewed focus on threats to the human-animal-environment interface as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and investments in One Health collaborations are expected to increase. Efforts to monitor the development of One Health Networks (OHNs) are essential to avoid duplication or misalignment of investments. This Series paper shows the global distribution of existing OHNs and assesses their collective characteristics to identify potential deficits in the ways OHNs have formed and to help increase the effectiveness of investments. We searched PubMed, Google, Google Scholar, and relevant conference websites for potential OHNs and identified 184 worldwide for further analysis. We developed four case studies to show important findings from our research and exemplify best practices in One Health operationalisation. Our findings show that, although more OHNs were formed in the past 10 years than in the preceding decade, investment in OHNs has not been equitably distributed; more OHNs are formed and headquartered in Europe than in any other region, and emerging infections and novel pathogens were the priority focus area for most OHNs, with fewer OHNs focusing on other important hazards and pressing threats to health security. We found substantial deficits in the OHNs collaboration model regarding the diversity of stakeholder and sector representation, which we argue impedes effective and equitable OHN formation and contributes to other imbalances in OHN distribution and priorities. These findings are supported by previous evidence that shows the skewed investment in One Health thus far. The increased attention to One Health after the COVID-19 pandemic is an opportunity to focus efforts and resources to areas that need them most. Analyses, such as this Series paper, should be used to establish databases and repositories of OHNs worldwide. Increased attention should then be given to understanding existing resource allocation and distribution patterns, establish more egalitarian networks that encompass the breadth of One Health issues, and serve communities most affected by emerging, re-emerging, or endemic threats at the human-animal-environment interface.

How prepared is the world? Identifying weaknesses in existing assessment frameworks for global health security through a One Health approach.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed faults in the way we assess preparedness and response capacities for public health emergencies. Existing frameworks are limited in scope, and do not sufficiently consider complex social, economic, political, regulatory, and ecological factors. One Health, through its focus on the links among humans, animals, and ecosystems, is a valuable approach through which existing assessment frameworks can be analysed and new ways forward proposed. Although in the past few years advances have been made in assessment tools such as the International Health Regulations Joint External Evaluation, a rapid and radical increase in ambition is required. To sufficiently account for the range of complex systems in which health emergencies occur, assessments should consider how problems are defined across stakeholders and the wider sociopolitical environments in which structures and institutions operate. Current frameworks do little to consider anthropogenic factors in disease emergence or address the full array of health security hazards across the social-ecological system. A complex and interdependent set of challenges threaten human, animal, and ecosystem health, and we cannot afford to overlook important contextual factors, or the determinants of these shared threats. Health security assessment frameworks should therefore ensure that the process undertaken to prioritise and build capacity adheres to core One Health principles and that interventions and outcomes are assessed in terms of added value, trade-offs, and cobenefits across human, animal, and environmental health systems.

Zoonotic Tuberculosis - The Changing Landscape.

Despite slow reductions in the annual burden of active human tuberculosis (TB) cases, zoonotic TB (zTB) remains a poorly monitored and an important unaddressed global problem. There is a higher incidence in some regions and countries, especially where close association exists between growing numbers of cattle (the major source of Mycobacterium bovis) and people, many suffering from poverty, and where dairy products are consumed unpasteurised. More attention needs to be focused on possible increased zTB incidence resulting from growth in dairy production globally and increased demand in low income countries in particular. Evidence of new zoonotic mycobacterial strains in South Asia and Africa (e.g. M. orygis), warrants urgent assessment of prevalence, potential drivers and risk in order to develop appropriate interventions. Control of M. bovis infection in cattle through detect and cull policies remain the mainstay of reducing zTB risk, whilst in certain circumstances animal vaccination is proving beneficial. New point of care diagnostics will help to detect animal infections and human cases. Given the high burden of human tuberculosis (caused by M. tuberculosis) in endemic areas, animals are affected by reverse zoonosis, including multi-drug resistant strains. This, may create drug resistant reservoirs of infection in animals. Like COVID-19, zTB is evolving in an ever-changing global landscape.

Complete Genome Sequencing of Field Isolates of Peste des Petits Ruminants Virus from Tanzania Revealed a High Nucleotide Identity with Lineage III PPR Viruses.

Peste des petits ruminants virus (PPRV) causes a highly devastating disease of sheep and goats that threatens food security, small ruminant production and susceptible endangered wild ruminants. With policy directed towards achieving global PPR eradication, the establishment of cost-effective genomic surveillance tools is critical where PPR is endemic. Genomic data can provide sufficient in-depth information to identify the pockets of endemicity responsible for PPRV persistence and viral evolution, and direct an appropriate vaccination response. Yet, access to the required sequencing technology is low in resource-limited settings and is compounded by the difficulty of transporting clinical samples from wildlife across international borders due to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) of Wild Fauna and Flora, and Nagoya Protocol regulations. Oxford nanopore MinION sequencing technology has recently demonstrated an extraordinary performance in the sequencing of PPRV due to its rapidity, utility in endemic countries and comparatively low cost per sample when compared to other whole-genome (WGS) sequencing platforms. In the present study, Oxford nanopore MinION sequencing was utilised to generate complete genomes of PPRV isolates collected from infected goats in Ngorongoro and Momba districts in the northern and southern highlands of Tanzania during 2016 and 2018, respectively. The tiling multiplex polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was carried out with twenty-five pairs of long-read primers. The resulting PCR amplicons were used for nanopore library preparation and sequencing. The analysis of output data was complete genomes of PPRV, produced within four hours of sequencing (accession numbers: MW960272 and MZ322753). Phylogenetic analysis of the complete genomes revealed a high nucleotide identity, between 96.19 and 99.24% with lineage III PPRV currently circulating in East Africa, indicating a common origin. The Oxford nanopore MinION sequencer can be deployed to overcome diagnostic and surveillance challenges in the PPR Global Control and Eradication program. However, the coverage depth was uneven across the genome and amplicon dropout was observed mainly in the GC-rich region between the matrix (M) and fusion (F) genes of PPRV. Thus, larger field studies are needed to allow the collection of sufficient data to assess the robustness of nanopore sequencing technology.

Zoonotic disease preparedness in sub-Saharan African countries.

BACKGROUND: The emergence of high consequence pathogens such as Ebola and SARS-CoV-2, along with the continued burden of neglected diseases such as rabies, has highlighted the need for preparedness for emerging and endemic infectious diseases of zoonotic origin in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) using a One Health approach. To identify trends in SSA preparedness, the World Health Organization (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) reports were analysed. JEEs are voluntary, collaborative processes to assess country's capacities to prevent, detect and rapidly respond to public health risks. This report aimed to analyse the JEE zoonotic disease preparedness data as a whole and identify strengths and weaknesses. METHODS: JEE zoonotic disease preparedness scores for 44 SSA countries who had completed JEEs were analysed. An overall zoonotic disease preparedness score was calculated as an average of the sum of all the SSA country zoonotic disease preparedness scores and compared to the overall mean JEE score. Zoonotic disease preparedness indicators were analysed and data were collated into regions to identify key areas of strength. RESULTS: The mean 'Zoonotic disease' preparedness score (2.35, range 1.00-4.00) was 7% higher compared to the mean overall JEE preparedness score (2.19, range 1.55-3.30), putting 'Zoonotic Diseases' 5th out of 19 JEE sub-areas for preparedness. The average scores for each 'Zoonotic Disease' category were 2.45 for 'Surveillance Systems', 2.76 for 'Veterinary Workforce' and 1.84 for 'Response Mechanisms'. The Southern African region scored highest across the 'Zoonotic disease' categories (2.87).A multisectoral priority zoonotic pathogens list is in place for 43% of SSA countries and 70% reported undertaking national surveillance on 1-5 zoonotic diseases. 70% of SSA countries reported having public health training courses in place for veterinarians and 30% had veterinarians in all districts (reported as sufficient staffing). A multisectoral action plan for zoonotic outbreaks was in place for 14% countries and 32% reported having an established inter-agency response team for zoonotic outbreaks. The zoonotic diseases that appeared most in reported country priority lists were rabies and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) (both 89%), anthrax (83%), and brucellosis (78%). CONCLUSIONS: With 'Zoonotic Diseases' ranking 5th in the JEE sub-areas and a mean SSA score 7% greater than the overall mean JEE score, zoonotic disease preparedness appears to have the attention of most SSA countries. However, the considerable range suggests that some countries have more measures in place than others, which may perhaps reflect the geography and types of pathogens that commonly occur. The category 'Response Mechanisms' had the lowest mean score across SSA, suggesting that implementing a multisectoral action plan and response team could provide the greatest gains.

Estimation of novel coronavirus (COVID-19) reproduction number and case fatality rate: A systematic review and meta-analysis.

BACKGROUND AND AIMS: Realizing the transmission potential and the magnitude of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) aids public health monitoring, strategies, and preparation. Two fundamental parameters, the basic reproduction number (R 0) and case fatality rate (CFR) of COVID-19, help in this understanding process. The objective of this study was to estimate the R 0 and CFR of COVID-19 and assess whether the parameters vary in different regions of the world. METHODS: We carried out a systematic review to find the reported estimates of the R 0 and the CFR in articles from international databases between January 1 and August 31, 2020. Random-effect models and Forest plots were implemented to evaluate the mean effect size of R 0 and the CFR. Furthermore, R 0 and CFR of the studies were quantified based on geographic location, the tests/thousand population, and the median population age of the countries where the studies were conducted. To assess statistical heterogeneity among the selected articles, the I 2 statistic and the Cochran's Q test were used. RESULTS: Forty-five studies involving R 0 and 34 studies involving CFR were included. The pooled estimation of R 0 was 2.69 (95% CI: 2.40, 2.98), and that of the CFR was 2.67 (2.25, 3.13). The CFR in different regions of the world varied significantly, from 2.49 (2.08, 2.94) in Asia to 3.40 (2.81, 4.04) in North America. We observed higher mean CFR values for the countries with lower tests (3.15 vs 2.16) and greater median population age (3.13 vs 2.27). However, R 0 did not vary significantly in different regions of the world. CONCLUSIONS: An R 0 of 2.69 and a CFR of 2.67 indicate the severity of the COVID-19. Although R 0 and CFR may vary over time, space, and demographics, we recommend considering these figures in control and prevention measures.

The Global Case-Fatality Rate of COVID-19 Has Been Declining Since May 2020.

The objective of this study was to evaluate the trend of reported case fatality rate (rCFR) of COVID-19 over time, using globally reported COVID-19 cases and mortality data. We collected daily COVID-19 diagnoses and mortality data from the WHO's daily situation reports dated January 1 to December 31, 2020. We performed three time-series models [simple exponential smoothing, auto-regressive integrated moving average, and automatic forecasting time-series (Prophet)] to identify the global trend of rCFR for COVID-19. We used beta regression models to investigate the association between the rCFR and potential predictors of each country and reported incidence rate ratios (IRRs) of each variable. The weekly global cumulative COVID-19 rCFR reached a peak at 7.23% during the 17th week (April 22-28, 2020). We found a positive and increasing trend for global daily rCFR values of COVID-19 until the 17th week (pre-peak period) and then a strong declining trend up until the 53rd week (post-peak period) toward 2.2% (December 29-31, 2020). In pre-peak of rCFR, the percentage of people aged 65 and above and the prevalence of obesity were significantly associated with the COVID-19 rCFR. The declining trend of global COVID-19 rCFR was not merely because of increased COVID-19 testing, because COVID-19 tests per 1,000 population had poor predictive value. Decreasing rCFR could be explained by an increased rate of infection in younger people or by the improvement of health care management, shielding from infection, and/or repurposing of several drugs that had shown a beneficial effect on reducing fatality because of COVID-19.

"Health in" and "Health of" Social-Ecological Systems: A Practical Framework for the Management of Healthy and Resilient Agricultural and Natural Ecosystems.

The past two decades have seen an accumulation of theoretical and empirical evidence for the interlinkages between human health and well-being, biodiversity and ecosystem services, and agriculture. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the devastating impacts that an emerging pathogen, of animal origin, can have on human societies and economies. A number of scholars have called for the wider adoption of "One Health integrated approaches" to better prevent, and respond to, the threats of emerging zoonotic diseases. However, there are theoretical and practical challenges that have precluded the full development and practical implementation of this approach. Whilst integrated approaches to health are increasingly adopting a social-ecological system framework (SES), the lack of clarity in framing the key concept of resilience in health contexts remains a major barrier to its implementation by scientists and practitioners. We propose an operational framework, based on a transdisciplinary definition of Socio-Ecological System Health (SESH) that explicitly links health and ecosystem management with the resilience of SES, and the adaptive capacity of the actors and agents within SES, to prevent and cope with emerging health and environmental risks. We focus on agricultural transitions that play a critical role in disease emergence and biodiversity conservation, to illustrate the proposed participatory framework to frame and co-design SESH interventions. Finally, we highlight critical changes that are needed from researchers, policy makers and donors, in order to engage communities and other stakeholders involved in the management of their own health and that of the underpinning ecosystems.

Beyond banning wildlife trade: COVID-19, conservation and development.

One of the immediate responses to COVID-19 has been a call to ban wildlife trade given the suspected origin of the pandemic in a Chinese market selling and butchering wild animals. There is clearly an urgent need to tackle wildlife trade that is illegal, unsustainable or carries major risks to human health, biodiversity conservation or meeting acceptable animal welfare standards. However, some of the suggested actions in these calls go far beyond tackling these risks and have the potential to undermine human rights, damage conservation incentives and harm sustainable development. There are a number of reasons for this concerns. First calls for bans on wildlife markets often include calls for bans on wet markets, but the two are not the same thing, and wet markets can be a critical underpinning of informal food systems. Second, wildlife trade generates essential resources for the world's most vulnerable people, contributing to food security for millions of people, particularly in developing countries. Third, wildlife trade bans have conservation risks including driving trade underground, making it even harder to regulate, and encouraging further livestock production. Fourth, in many cases, sustainable wildlife trade can provide key incentives for local people to actively protect species and the habitat they depend on, leading to population recoveries. Most importantly, a singular focus on wildlife trade overlooks the key driver of the emergence of infectious diseases: habitat destruction, largely driven by agricultural expansion and deforestation, and industrial livestock production. We suggest that the COVID-19 crisis provides a unique opportunity for a paradigm shift both in our global food system and also in our approach to conservation. We make specific suggestions as to what this entails, but the overriding principle is that local people must be at the heart of such policy shifts.

COVID-19-Zoonosis or Emerging Infectious Disease?

The World Health Organization defines a zoonosis as any infection naturally transmissible from vertebrate animals to humans. The pandemic of Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been classified as a zoonotic disease, however, no animal reservoir has yet been found, so this classification is premature. We propose that COVID-19 should instead be classified an "emerging infectious disease (EID) of probable animal origin." To explore if COVID-19 infection fits our proposed re-categorization vs. the contemporary definitions of zoonoses, we reviewed current evidence of infection origin and transmission routes of SARS-CoV-2 virus and described this in the context of known zoonoses, EIDs and "spill-over" events. Although the initial one hundred COVID-19 patients were presumably exposed to the virus at a seafood Market in China, and despite the fact that 33 of 585 swab samples collected from surfaces and cages in the market tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, no virus was isolated directly from animals and no animal reservoir was detected. Elsewhere, SARS-CoV-2 has been detected in animals including domesticated cats, dogs, and ferrets, as well as captive-managed mink, lions, tigers, deer, and mice confirming zooanthroponosis. Other than circumstantial evidence of zoonotic cases in mink farms in the Netherlands, no cases of natural transmission from wild or domesticated animals have been confirmed. More than 40 million human COVID-19 infections reported appear to be exclusively through human-human transmission. SARS-CoV-2 virus and COVID-19 do not meet the WHO definition of zoonoses. We suggest SARS-CoV-2 should be re-classified as an EID of probable animal origin.

Lockdown measures in response to COVID-19 in nine sub-Saharan African countries.

Lockdown measures have been introduced worldwide to contain the transmission of COVID-19. However, the term 'lockdown' is not well-defined. Indeed, WHO's reference to 'so-called lockdown measures' indicates the absence of a clear and universally accepted definition of the term 'lockdown'. We propose a definition of 'lockdown' based on a two-by-two matrix that categorises different communicable disease measures based on whether they are compulsory or voluntary; and whether they are targeted at identifiable individuals or facilities, or whether they are applied indiscriminately to a general population or area. Using this definition, we describe the design, timing and implementation of lockdown measures in nine countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. While there were some commonalities in the implementation of lockdown across these countries, a more notable finding was the variation in the design, timing and implementation of lockdown measures. We also found that the number of reported cases is heavily dependent on the number of tests carried out, and that testing rates ranged from 2031 to 63 928 per million population up until 7 September 2020. The reported number of COVID-19 deaths per million population also varies (0.4 to 250 up until 7 September 2020), but is generally low when compared with countries in Europe and North America. While lockdown measures may have helped inhibit community transmission, the pattern and nature of the epidemic remains unclear. However, there are signs of lockdown harming health by affecting the functioning of the health system and causing social and economic disruption.

The Global Health Security index and Joint External Evaluation score for health preparedness are not correlated with countries' COVID-19 detection response time and mortality outcome.

Global Health Security Index (GHSI) and Joint External Evaluation (JEE) are two well-known health security and related capability indices. We hypothesised that countries with higher GHSI or JEE scores would have detected their first COVID-19 case earlier, and would experience lower mortality outcome compared to countries with lower scores. We evaluated the effectiveness of GHSI and JEE in predicting countries' COVID-19 detection response times and mortality outcome (deaths/million). We used two different outcomes for the evaluation: (i) detection response time, the duration of time to the first confirmed case detection (from 31st December 2019 to 20th February 2020 when every country's first case was linked to travel from China) and (ii) mortality outcome (deaths/million) until 11th March and 1st July 2020, respectively. We interpreted the detection response time alongside previously published relative risk of the importation of COVID-19 cases from China. We performed multiple linear regression and negative binomial regression analysis to evaluate how these indices predicted the actual outcome. The two indices, GHSI and JEE were strongly correlated (r = 0.82), indicating a good agreement between them. However, both GHSI (r = 0.31) and JEE (r = 0.37) had a poor correlation with countries' COVID-19-related mortality outcome. Higher risk of importation of COVID-19 from China for a given country was negatively correlated with the time taken to detect the first case in that country (adjusted R2 = 0.63-0.66), while the GHSI and JEE had minimal predictive value. In the negative binomial regression model, countries' mortality outcome was strongly predicted by the percentage of the population aged 65 and above (incidence rate ratio (IRR): 1.10 (95% confidence interval (CI): 1.01-1.21) while overall GHSI score (IRR: 1.01 (95% CI: 0.98-1.01)) and JEE (IRR: 0.99 (95% CI: 0.96-1.02)) were not significant predictors. GHSI and JEE had lower predictive value for detection response time and mortality outcome due to COVID-19. We suggest introduction of a population healthiness parameter, to address demographic and comorbidity vulnerabilities, and reappraisal of the ranking system and methods used to obtain the index based on experience gained from this pandemic.